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expression, control that would not be permitted if the expression
were that of a private citizen. Such control is a condition of
service.I3
Again, this is not to suggest that the government can control
military speech completely. At some point the connection between
the military endeavor on the one hand and a soldier's expression on
the other becomes too attenuated. Where that point lies seems a
question best answered initially by the military, subject ultimately
to court review. Military leaders like to get the job done, and the
value of communication is forced upon those who don't already appreciate it. Military leaders also know a lot about the nature of
discipline; martinets shouting orders went out of style long ago.
Doubtless the interest in free expression by soldiers is not weighed
as accurately by the military as it is by the courts, but it is just as
likely that a court will not weigh the military's interest in discipline
as accurately as the military will. It therefore makes sense for the
courts generally to defer to the military in evaluating that interest.
Certainly an across-the-board increase in the amount of court intrusion into the military communication structure requires far more
justification than Packer has presented.

TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW
YORK CITY POLICE. By H. Richard Uviller.1 Chicago:
Contemporary Books. 1988. Pp. xix, 234. Cloth, $19.95.
David Dolinko 2

Appellate judges and legal academics too often lack firsthand
acquaintance with the front-line realities of the criminal justice system. Fearing that his own exposure to those realities as a young
prosecutor had grown stale during fourteen years teaching law, Professor H. Richard Uviller spent eight months of a recent sabbatical
"hanging out with" and observing police in the crime-ridden Ninth
Precinct of New York City. The book that resulted should interest
13. While service is not always voluntary, everyone recognizes that military service involves at least the kinds of loss of freedom that are incident to voluntary employment. If a
drafted soldier has the freedom to ftout orders, then it doesn't make much sense to have a
draft at all. Maybe the draft is unwise or unconstitutional, but surely such a conclusion is not
required simply by the freedom of expression principles of the first amendment.
I.
2.

Professor of Law, Columbia University.
Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles.
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anyone concerned with the mind-set and working environment of
the police and their responses to the constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence of the past few decades.
This is not to deny the book's failings. It is not even remotely a
sound piece of social scientific research-unsurprisingly, given Uviller's naively Baconian decision to "resis[t] all temptations to forumlate a theory to guide my investigation." No reason is given to
suppose that New York's police department is fairly representative
of big-city American departments generally.3 Even within the New
York department, the particular unit Uviller observed-a special
robbery investigation team called "9 RIP"-is highly unusual, mixing patrolmen and detectives in an uncommonly egalitarian fashion
that made it an informal, unstructured "pocket of anarchy in the
midst of a vast, paramilitary, bureaucratic structure."
Nonetheless, the dearth of empirical information on the realworld context and consequences of the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure decisions should make us grateful for Uviller's anecdotes
and observations. These come interspersed with mini-lectures on a
variety of topics including the Miranda doctrine, the conduct of
lineups, and how to get a search warrant, which will be of interest
primarily to readers generally unfamiliar with the criminal law and
its enforcement mechanisms. The anecdotes and observations offer
a compelling though necessarily partial picture of the atmosphere
and setting of police life and the ways in which police respond to
the constraints of the Constitution as judicially interpreted.
Physically, the officers Uviller studied moved through a
cramped, no-frills, timeworn stationhouse in a generally down-atthe-heels neighborhood with more than its share of homeless persons, prostitutes, abandoned buildings and thriving drug traffickers.
Emotionally, they inhabited a world of frustration arising from "the
inescapable sense of helplessness at the heart of power, the maddening inability to make the process work despite all the authority implicit in the badge." Mistrust of outsiders is pervasive-as Sergeant
Browne, 9 RIP's commander, laments, "no one ever gives us the
whole truth. I usually end up not knowing what the hell really happened." Citizen complaints of brutality arouse resentment, and citi3. Previous observers have found wide disparities in the behavior of different departments. Charles Silberman, for example, spoke of "a world of difference between the cold,
aloof, impersonal 'professional' style cultivated by Los Angeles police, ... and the warmer,
more personal and civil ... orientation of police in cities such as Oakland and New York."
Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Cn"minal Justice 289 (Vintage Books, 1978). James
Q. Wilson's study of eight American police departments distinguished three styles of policing:
"watchman," "legalistic," and "service." James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior
(Harvard U. Press, 1970).
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zens seeking police assistance are themselves often less than
upstanding. The non-police components of the criminal justice system are not much better. Judges, especially appellate judges, seem
aloof, unsympathetic, even dense, and assistant DA's are often hectoring, dismissive, and-to the cops-cowardly. Even the police
force itself can exasperate, with its stifling bureaucracy "that always
seems more concerned with rules, statistics, and risk aversion than
with good ideas and initiative"-prompting in one officer a "feeling
that this department is run by morons."
Much of this grim picture duplicates previous observers' findings. Police skepticism and distrust of the public is frequently
noted,4 and Jerome Skolnick reported in the mid-sixties that police
thought judges unreasonable, unintelligent meddlers abdicating
their crime-fighting responsibilities.s Skolnick, however, painted a
much more harmonious picture of police-prosecutor relations, finding low-level screening prosecutors deferential to police and highranking prosecutors able to criticize them without arousing resentment.6 It would be interesting to know whether the bad blood Uviller discovered stems from specific features of the Manhattan DA's
office, and how common or idiosyncratic those features are.
Uviller's view of the police officer's world is by no means
wholly grim, however, and comes nowhere near Arthur Niederhoffer's bleak picture of rampant cynicism "at all levels, in every
branch of law enforcement."? Uviller's officers find their work
meaningful and strive to achieve justice. They approach even the
most dangerous situations with "an air of casual confidence," taking
charge with crisp authority and demanding respect and deferencesuccessfully, in most instances. These officers value their hunches
and pride themselves on their ability to "sense" criminal activity, to
the point of occasional overconfidence. These attitudes (essentially
those Skolnick described as the police "craftsman" approach) help
explain the cops' resentment when second-guessed by distant judges
and their dismay at the loss of control and challenges to their views
which they experience in the judicial arena.
4. William Westley's 1951 doctoral thesis, published in 1970, harps on this theme.
William A. Westley, Violence and the Police 106-08, 110-11, 145 (MIT Press, 1970). See also
Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior at 21·29 (cited in role 3); Silberman, Criminal Violence,
Criminal Justice at 325 (cited in note 3).
5. Jerome H. Skolnick. Justice Without Tn'al 225-29 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed.,
1966). But one more recent study found police less cynical toward judges and courts than
either firemen or college students. Phil J. Crawford and Thomas J. Crawford, Police Attitudes Toward the Judicial System, II J. Police Sci. & Admin. 290, 293 (1983).
6. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial at 199-202 (cited in note 5).
7. Arthur Niederholfer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society 94
(Doubleday, 1967).
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Yet that arena, and particularly its remote appellate judges,
sets the ground rules that constrain police discretion in detecting
and investigating crime. How do the police respond? Uviller reports that they generally follow the law, and fall back on a reliable
intuitive sense of fairness in situations where the law gives them vast
discretion. Thus the police "understand the basic principles of
search and seizure law as expounded by the High Court" and "felt
its constraint upon their actions." They have "internalized the basic ingredients of a fair lineup" and they "Mirandize" suspects
before any formal interrogation-though not immediately upon
arrest (which is not legally required). Though warrants give officers
almost unlimited discretion to search disruptively and destructively,
cops routinely obey self-imposed limits. Similar restraint controls
their use of weapons and their interaction with citizens on the
street-indeed, Uviller claims he "never saw an officer speak rudely
to a civilian, much less push someone around."s And 9 RIP won't
initiate robbery prosecutions without identification evidence supplying far more than the bare "probable cause" required by law.
Yet while the officers may know and grudgingly follow constitutional rules, they seem largely oblivious to the point of those rules.
Many seemed to think the Supreme Court's fourth amendment
cases reflected only a desire to deter searches and seizures,9 while
Miranda was "just another way for the courts to throw out perfectly good evidence."Jo They resented being expected to observe
8. It's hard to take this assertion at face value. Perhaps what seemed polite and unthreatening to Professor Uviller might appear rude to a citizen overawed by a "sudden, aggressive move" from the police, with their "firm tone" and ''hand ... placed heavily and
decisively." Perhaps the officers consciously or unconsciously modified their behavior in
Uviller's presence-though Uviller believes otherwise. Certainly, well-publicized incidents
such as the March 3, 1991 videotaped beating of an unarmed traffic arrestee by Los Angeles
police make one wonder how representative Uviller's polite 9 RIP cops can be. It's worth
noting that, as one review of Tempered Zeal pointed out, Uviller's Ninth Precinct itself is not
immune to blatant brutality: Ninth Precinct cops responded to a riot in a neighborhood park
in August 1988 by covering their badge numbers and beating civilians indiscriminately, and
by subsequently refusing to testify before the department's internal review board. See Book
Note, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1390, 1393 n.l3 (1990).
9. The police whom Uviller observed spoke bitterly of the frustration of seeing plainly
guilty criminals turned loose "because the judge didn't like the way the cop took the knife off
him." It is not clear whether they knew, or would be comforted by knowing, that most
statistical studies find the exclusionary rule's impact negligible. See Thomas Y. Davies, A
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary
Rule: The NJJ Study and Other Studies of ''lAst" A"ests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611.
10. Yet police generally may have grown to accept Miranda, as various observers report. See Tamar Jacoby, Why Cops Like Miranda. Newsweek 53 (July 18, 1988). After all,
the consensus is that Miranda has had little appreciable effect on the rate of confessions. Nor
has it curbed police use of lies, false sympathy, and similar tricky interrogation tactics-such
as those Uviller himself suggests to a dubious 9 RIP officer. The evolution and effect of the
Miranda doctrine are succinctly reviewed in Patrick A. Malone, "You Have the Right to
Remain Silent':· Miranda After Twenty Years, 55 Am. Scholar 367 (1986).
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rules that judges themselves fought over-and had only questionable authority to impose, anyway-while law professors "pretend[ed]
this stuff makes sense. "11 And their legal knowledge had glaring
gaps, like their belief in a "crime scene" exception to the search
warrant requirement despite its explicit rejection by the Supreme
Court a decade earlier, and their distinction-wholly spurious
under existing law-between a true arrest and merely "picking
someone up" for a stationhouse lineup. The officers' attitudes make
all too predictable their frequent resort to perjury to make their actions retroactively "fit" constitutional rules.
One of Uviller's most interesting claims is that the police suffer
a malady law professors routinely observe in students-a tendency
to seek and even invent hard-and-fast rules in place of the often
amorphous standards pervading the law. This craving for certainty
leads police to ascribe mistaken significance to rigid rules that they
develop, such as precise verbal formulae for questioning lineup witnesses or giving Miranda warnings, or the "two-hour/two-mile"
rule conjured up to govern the permissibility of show-ups. It could
also account for another phenomenon Uviller observes (without
drawing the connection): an occasional tendency for police to
"overestimate restrictions on their authority." Uviller's example is
the 9 RIP officers' refusal to arrest a robbery suspect without a confident lineup identification, which seems like another instance of police treating a policy of their own devising as if it were a rigid legal
requirement.
Uviller actually claims that overestimating restrictions is the
general police rule, not an occasional practice. His observations belie this, however-witness the cops' mistaken beliefs in a crimescene exception to the warrant requirement, an ability to "pick
someone up" for a lineup without probable cause, and the ease of
establishing consent to an otherwise unauthorized search or seizure.
Even these instances where police underestimate the restrictions on
their authority bespeak a longing for "bright line" rules: crime
scenes can always be searched; arrest always means full-scale custody, booking, and charging; consent needn't require detailed examination of all circumstances of the particular situation. It would be
interesting to see how prevalent among police the quest for cerII. Other observen; find police less hostile to Warren-era constitutional restraints. A
1986 survey of Chicago narcotics officen; concluded that they almost always unden;tood what
they'd done wrong when evidence was suppressed, and favored retaining the exclusionary
rule (though with a good faith exception) rather than abolishing it. Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1016 (1987).
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tainty Uviller observes really is, and how much police behavior it
might explain.
It would also be interesting to see more detailed empirical studies of the real-life constraints on the theoretical powers of the police.
Uviller provides a striking example when he discusses how the statutory availability of telephone search warrants, which greatly speed
up the warrant process and encourage officers to use it, has been
nullified in New York County by the turf-protective hostility of the
District Attorney's office. This is precisely the kind of information
most helpful to someone without firsthand law enforcement experience who reads appellate opinions on warrantless searches and wonders why the cops didn't just get a warrant-how long could it take,
anyway?
Although many of Uviller's observations, like those just discussed, are thought-provoking and suggestive, the book's episodic
format and a desire to touch on a wide range of topics prevent Uviller from developing any of them too deeply. More disturbingly, the
book is marred by a surprising number of legal errors and a pervasive reluctance to examine critically the perceptions and behavior of
the police.
For example, Uviller is wrong in treating the rule against coerced confessions as an outgrowth of the fifth amendment, in asserting that states are free "to extend federal as well as state
constitutional constructions," in declaring that "(a] request for
counsel operates exactly like a refusal to be questioned at all" for
Miranda purposes, and in defining "prejudice" as if it applied only
to the erroneous admission of evidence. His penchant for a "cop'seye" view of the law leads him to ridicule judicial aversion to hypnotically refreshed testimony as "one of those strange areas of conservative suspicion one encounters from time to time in law" in
which judges "shy away" from an otherwise well-regarded tool
"(w]ithout logic or reason" by relying on "bits of this and that
picked up from here and there." In fact, the leading cases excluding
such testimony-People v. Shirley 12 in California and People v.
Hughes 13 in New York-rely heavily on the writings of scientific
experts in detailing, carefully and at length, the unreliability of hypnosis. Elsewhere, too, Uviller seems too quick to accept the police
at face value or to put the best possible gloss on their behavioreven suggesting that police petjury isn't really so bad if it merely
circumvents an exclusionary rule. He never seems to wonder why
the officers he portrays as unfailingly polite and professional arouse
12.
13.

31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Ca. Rptr. 243 (1982).
59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
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such disbelief in "big-city jurors" and such fear in even the victims
of crime.
Despite its defects, Tempered Zeal is worth the attention of
students of the criminal justice system. Its ultimate message, like
Jerome Skolnick's a quarter-century ago, is that police are caught
between conflicting demands, but Uviller and Skolnick disagree on
what those demands are. For Uviller, the public demands both "effective anticrime activity and restraint," with cops "out in the
streets as a visible deterrent force as well as a crime-solving and
criminal-apprehension battalion, while at the same time ... law
bound [and] rule observant." Skolnick, by contrast, found little evidence that the citizenry wanted "restraint" at all, and instead depicted the police as caught in a "conflict between the democratic
ideology of work and the legal philosophy of a democracy."t4 Both
perspectives are illuminating, and still more light is needed. Perhaps the greatest service Professor Uviller's book can perform
would be to stimulate others to follow in his footsteps.

COURTS, CORRECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON
PRISONS AND JAilS.• Edited by John J. Dilullo, Jr.2
New York, N.Y.: The Oxford University Press. 1990. pp.
xii, 338. $32.50.
Elizabeth Alexander 3
I doubt that any lawyer can practice in the field of prison law,
whether on behalf of prisoners or on behalf of correctional officials,
and not be a legal realist. Whatever the situation in less polarized
14.

Skolnick, Justice Without Trial at 235 (cited in note 5).

I. This collection consists of the following essays: Malcolm M. Feeley and Roger A.
Hanson, The Impact of Judicia/Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis
and a Review of the Literature; John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Old Regime and the Ruiz Revolution;
Sheldon Ekland-Olson and Steve J. Martin, Ruiz: A Struggle Over Legitimacy; Ben M.
Crouch and James W. Marquart, Ruiz: Intervention and Emergent Order in Texas Prisons;
Bradley S. Chilton and Susette M. Talarico, Politics and Constitutional Interpretation in
Prison Reform Litigation: The Case of Guthrie v. Evans; Ted S. Storey, When Intervention
Works; Edward E. Rhine, The Rule of Law. Disciplinary Practices, and Rahway State Prison;
Bert Unseem, Crain: Nonreformist Prison Reform; Robert C. Bradley, Judicial Appointment
and Judicia/Intervention; Clair A. Cripe, Courts. Corrections. and the Constitution: A Practitioner's View; and John J. Dilulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons
and Jails.
2. Associate Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University.
3. Associate Director for Litigation, National Prison Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation.

